Boeremag (pronounced Boeure-Mach) is the label given to a group of men convicted of treason in South Africa, whose government described them as an extremist South African right-wing militia with white separatist aims. The Boeremag were accused of planning to overthrow the ruling African National Congress government and to reinstate a new Boer-administered republic reminiscent of the era when Boers administered independent republics during the 19th century following the Great Trek.
South African law-enforcement officials charged the Boeremag for being responsible for the 2002 Soweto bombings and arrested twenty-six men, alleged to be members of the Boeremag, in November and December 2002, reportedly seizing over 1,000 kilograms of explosives in the process. Further arrests followed in March 2003.
It has since been alleged that the Boeremag case was orchestrated by the Crime Intelligence Department of the South African ANC government as exposed by ex-crime intelligence captain Deon Loots in his affidavit (attached in English) to the High Court which was published in various media articles.
It has also been revealed that the South African government provides an annual slush fund of R600.000.000 (January 2017 exchange rate is 13.6 Rand to the US Dollar) for its crime intelligence department to source any anti-government movement, which does not require accounting for.
The first trial of the Boeremag suspects began under tight security in Pretoria during May 2003. Twenty-two men were charged with forty-two counts of treason, murder, and illegal weapons possession. Six pleaded not guilty, two have not entered pleas, one refuses to plead, and thirteen are challenging the court's jurisdiction, alleging that the post-apartheid constitution and government of South Africa are illegitimate.
During the trial plans to blow up South African actor Casper de Vries together with eight other individuals were revealed. The group is quoted as saying that the reason for this plan was because De Vries "was not on the right path".
In October 2004 the Pretoria High Court heard testimony from a witness, Deon Crous, who stated under oath that he had assisted two of the accused, Kobus Pretorius and Jacques Jordaan, to manufacture 1500 kg of explosives. Crous testified that five amounts of 300 kg were reserved for five separate bombs. One of the planned bomb attacks was cancelled as there was too high a risk of white civilians being injured. The bombs were to be detonated on December 13, 2002, with various attacks planned to follow the bombings.
In early May 2006 Herman van Rooyen and Rudi Gouws, two of the leading members being tried, were reported to have escaped. The two men were recaptured on 20 January 2007 and were set to appear in court to face charges of escape and the illegal possession of firearms.
In late October 2013, Mike du Toit, the ringleader of a plot to assassinate Nelson Mandela and expel Black people out of South Africa, was convicted of treason and sentenced to 35 years in prison. Twenty other members of Boeremag were also sentenced to prison terms of between five and 35 years. They included Herman van Rooyen and Rudi Gouws, two of the co-conspirators of Du Toit who were given longer sentences for their role in planting bombs in their attempt to assassinate Nelson Mandela.
These men have been imprisoned since 2002. The trial lasted 11 years.”
(Previous text from Wikipedia)
There is some dispute as to the correct translation of Boeremag. A noted Boer historian said "Farmer’s Force", the literal translation from the dictionary is Farmer’s May or Might but others say it is Farmer’s Militia. For purposes of this article Farmer’s Force appears to be the most appropriate use of the word.
A little background follows which might help others understand the Boeremag situation. Nicolaas Van Rensburg, the Seer (Seiner), gave many prophecies. These prophecies are found in the book "Voice of a Prophet", published in 1999 by Vaandel Publishers, Adriaan Snyman, author. See "South Africa" on this website. A paragraph from this book that relates to the Boeremag states as follows:
Merino Rams and Blue Letters
"In March 1955, Mr. Boy Mussmann wrote a letter to Die Volksblad, relating what the Seer had told him about four important events which still had to be fulfilled, and when they could be expected to do so: (1) Great war troubles which would plunge the country into chaos; (2) A brown-suited man who would unite the nation again; (3) a coup d’etat, and (4) Total freedom and prosperity for the Afrikaner. Mr. Mussmann wrote as follows: “Sir—During the past few days many people have asked me about the man dressed in a brown suit as mentioned by the Seer van Rensburg. He did not say this man would necessarily be the president. Brown is our national colour. He said the man who would address the burghers from a hillock (small hill) north of Lichtenburg, would be dressed in a brown suit. The Seer spoke about our future Republic... if the Seer’s predictions are correct, then we must not expect to get our Republic via the ballot box, but by means of a coup d’etat.”
The ANC apparently was well aware of van Rensburg and his prophecies. The prophecies were viewed as a threat to them and it is easy to understand why the ANC may be terrified of what may come to pass. The Boermag case was a contrived situation conceived to prevent van Rensburg's prophecies from coming to fruition. The actions of the SA police under the direction of the ANC were to instrument to accomplish those evil deeds.
Deon Loots, the white police officer who set up the conspiracy to entrap the men subsequently repented after his two year old daughter died in a car accident. This incident prompted him to "get right with God". Ultimately Loots was denied a promotion and had to resign under some form of a disability agreement.
Exodus 20:16 Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.
(in Afrikaans) Jy mag nie vals getuienis teen 'n ander gee nie.
Loots and others sold their souls to Satan. Now Loots decided that he had to come clean. There is no mention in the affidavit of anyone being a "Free Mason". It is well known that Free Masons will lie for other Masons as they have taken oaths to do so. See my page on Masonry on this website. While Loots referred to oaths he did not give any specificity. Loots' guilt in this matter caused him to write a 14 page affidavit describing in graphic detail how the South African Police Crime Intelligence division was forced by the South African (African National Congress Party of Nelson Mandela) government to find white right wingers who were plotting the overthrow of the state. SA police couldn't uncover any plots but they were under such severe political pressure that they promptly set one up.
Even then, the alleged participants didn't actually discuss, plan or do anything. In other words, believe it or not, the police's covert agents were not able to persuade any of the right-wingers to undertake anything illegal, so they just fabricated various crimes.
In fact the majority of the alleged conspirators only met one another in jail! What's more, the supposed conspiracy did not have a name so the police made one up. Boeremag in Afrikaans is translated as Bore Militia in English.
The evidence presented during the entire ten-year long (yes, ten years) trial was a fabrication. It was repeatedly shown, over and over-again, to be a farcical fairy tale.
The legal system in South Africa is based upon the Roman Dutch Civil Law system. There are no juries just three judge panels. Trials can take years and apparently go though many phases.
Dates, times, places, names, actions and activities were REPEATEDLY shown to be manufactured fables but the judge methodically rejected all evidence which did not concur with the state's case. In other words, the ANC government, come hell or high water, will stop at nothing to destroy white right-wingers.
Loot's affidavit in Afrikaans may be independently found on the Internet, search under Boeremag, Kaptein Deon Loots, verklaring. I have used Google Translate – Afrikaans to English -- to try to create an English translation. I found another Afrikaans to English translation at http://censorbugbear-reports.blogspot.com/2013/02/ex-intelligence-cop-deon-loots-defends.html Frankly it appears that this translation was also computer driven as it has numerous English mistakes and leaves the English reader uncertain as to what the actual import was supposed to be.
No mention is made in the affidavit concerning Free Masons. Yet this case seems to reek of their presence. Cops -- abuse of power, lies, harm to others, secrecy, oaths, dishonesty.
I have reviewed the Google translation and made some minor grammatical changes as well as total sentence restructuring so as to make the translation more understandable in English. Regardless many translated English sentences still do not convey any precise information or thoughts. Afrikaans does not conjugate verbs and this is a major problem for any computer translator to restructure a sentence into English. Unlike English, Afrikaans follows the German model where verbs frequently in the past perfect tense and after a preposition at the start or in the middle of a sentence, typically come at the end of a sentence. The result is often a crude and meaningless translation into English. French, Spanish and Italian translations into English do not have this problem. Afrikaans again follows German where nouns are typically compounded and have to be separated for a meaningful English understanding. Grammatical mistakes, lack of space between sentences etc. also had to be reconciled as a computer directed translation simply does not have the level of intelligence to discern what was intended.
30 December 2016
Boeremag case - Loots' statement
February 8, 2013 -
To the International (non-South African) Reader
a Foreword & Translators’ Notes
The affidavit of Deon Loots has been translated into English in order to provide compelling evidence to international supporters of South Africa’s Suidlanders (English – Southerners) http://www.suidlanders.org civil defence organization of the methodical process of persecution of conservative Christian right wing Caucasians of the Boer nation in South Africa.
This affidavit serves to support our reasons for founding Suidlanders and for safeguarding ourselves as non-belligerent, non-seditionist, non-insurrectionist, non-militant, civilians. This affidavit echoes Genocide Watch’s allegation that white South Africans are presently in the penultimate stage before genocide.
It is not, in-and-of itself, presented as a salient reason for the formation of Suidlanders.
It is merely evidence in support of the various reasons why conservative Christian white South Africans of the Boer nation have come to recognize that the persecution and murder of Conservative Christian Boers is methodical and deliberate.
In 2001, 23 men were arrested as conspirators against the state of South Africa in an organization called Die Boeremag. Die Boeremag is best translated into English as The Boer Militia.
“Boers” is the name given to the homogenous group of typically-conservative Christian descendants of Calvinists, Huguenots, and Lutherans who fled persecution in Europe and settled in South Africa from 1652 onwards and then fled, in ~1833, from British persecution after the British annexation of the Cape of Good Hope colony.
The noun Boer means farmer and, as a proper-noun, it is derived from the close ties to the land of these people.
The language of the Boers is Afrikaans but the commonly-accepted appellation Afrikaners is in fact reviled by orthodox Boers. Afrikaners is rightly considered o be an external imposition, and by no means the name by which the Boers first knew themselves.
Even during the Anglo-Boer Wars, the British referred to their foes by the term that they, the British, heard them, the Boers, use for themselves i.e. Boers, and not Afrikaners
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle of Sherlock Holmes fame referred to them as Boers
Indeed, Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery referred to them as ‘”those marvelous fighting Boers”
As such, the word Afrikaners is generally regarded by conservatives as possessing all sorts of detestable connotations
The men of the Boeremag were charged with all manner of crimes from possession of illegal weapons to terrorism and treason
It is a matter of record that most of the men had never met one another until they were imprisoned together
It is a matter of record that the majority of the men took false hope (that they had been arrested by mistake) from hearing from the police that they were supposedly members of the Boeremag. They’d never heard of the organization.
Indeed, it later turned out that the police, having determined to concoct a conspiracy, then came up with the name Boeremag for the conspiracy
Unbelievably, their trial lasted ten years
It is a matter of record that the presiding judge rejected any-and-all evidence which did not support the state’s case
This drama should quite naturally have been the most newsworthy event in the short history of the “New South Africa” that was established on 27th April 1994 with Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress party’s victory in the first multi-racial elections. Inexplicably, it received little-to-no coverage in mainstream media
A reading of this document will quickly reveal why the powers that be deemed it best not to air this dirty laundry too publicly and why the details of the case and the trial should not be subjected to scrutiny by members of the public.
The following affidavit was drafted by the key police instigator and/or handler, Capt. Deon Loots.
He did it following the tragic death of his two-year-old daughter in a car collision, when, as he has subsequently confessed, his conscience got the better of him
For months, he stood outside the High Court handing out the affidavit to people entering the court and pleading with them to believe that the entire Boeremag case was a concocted fable specifically intended to intimidate conservative white South Africans
The use of the word Uncle as an honorific i.e. such as Mister, Professor, etc. is a common form of respect among the Boer people. Indeed, it is always used for an older man, as tannie (aunty) is used for older women, even by adults of all ages
The affidavit is usually chronological but readers should not be surprised by occasional jumps forward in the story before returning to the correct sequence of events.
The acronym MDI or Mdi stands for misdaadintelligensie – crime intelligence, a South African police department. Capt. Loots employed both the formats MDI and Mdi, interchangeably. Both would be commonly acceptable in the Afrikaans language. We have stuck to Mdi throughout purely for the sake of consistency.
Finally, readers should bear aware that this affidavit was made in the words of an ordinary man, not a writer; therefore, in places the quality of the language can leave a lot to be desired. This poses a significant problem: an Afrikaans speaker would be able to “read around” sentences and phrases which are linguistically weak, ambiguous, or, frankly, incomprehensible; he would be able to decrypt weak sentences by using their contexts as a key of sorts; a foreign English-speaker would not be able to do so. Therefore, the translators have been obliged to resort to making, sometimes wholesale, corrections wherever it was necessary for the sake of clarity.
As such, and although this translation has been written with one eye constantly on the verbatim letter of Capt. Deon Loots’s original, it cannot be construed as “100% literal” from beginning to end. A score of occasions have demanded our own interventions. It may, however, reliably be deemed to convey the spirit of Capt. Deon’s Loots’s original.
Boeremag case - Loots' statement
February 8, 2013 -
AFFIDAVIT - Deon Loots
I, the undersigned, Deon LOOTS, declare under oath as follows:
1. I am an adult male with identity number 611220 5009 084, a former member of the South African Police Service (SAPS), currently resident in Pretoria.
The content of this statement is within my personal knowledge and belief (except where expressly stated otherwise, and/or by necessary implication from the context would seem otherwise) and it is true and correct.
My relationship with the police:
2. I am part of a family that has strong ties with the police in South Africa.
3. My father, John Wahl Loots was throughout his career a policeman and held the rank of full colonel in the South African Police when he died in 1987.
4. My older sister, Esmeralda, after her schooling became a police officer of the South African Police and stayed until she retired as a full colonel with medical pensions after 2000. She was married to a policeman who progressed to the rank of full colonel in the South African Police before he retired in the nineties.
5. My younger sister is still a lieutenant colonel in the South African Police Service's Crime Intelligence Unit, and her ex-husband is an officer in the same unit. They were divorced in November 2011.
6. My younger brother is currently a captain in the Department of Correctional Services in Pretoria. His wife is a major in the South African Air Force.
7. I got married on December 11, 1993 to my wife (also a police officer). In 1996, my spouse transferred to the headquarters of the South African Police Service at Wachthuis in Pretorius Street, Pretoria. She was later transferred to the Crime Intelligence Unit of the South African Police Service and currently holds the rank of full colonel.
8. I learned from my parents (changed to clarify sentence) a strong sense of fairness, discipline and civilized norms. I learned that people with no respect for such things are villains who promote chaos and anarchy in society.
9. Since 1979, I was in the service of the South African Police, where I performed my services at Gezina SAPS Radio Control, Pretoria. From then until 1987 I was attached to the Riot Unit, whence I was transferred to the Kwa Ndebele Safety Unit.
10. Since 1990, I worked for the Security Branch of the South African Police in Pretoria, Northern Transvaal Province; where I was primarily responsible for the monitoring of actions and activities in Mamelodi and Kwa Ndebele, in the terrain of the so-called left-wing sphere.
11. In 1994, I was transferred to, and attached to, the "Right-Reactionary Desk" of the then Crime Information leg, where my focus was primarily aimed at monitoring the activities of so-called "right-wing" reactionary individuals, groups and movements; and to infiltrate and investigate them. I was promoted to the rank of captain.
12. In 1996, I worked in the overt part of the police's crime intelligence unit, (herein referred to by the acronym Mdi. I use this Afrikaans acronym whereas it is known in English as Crime Intelligence or CI). In 1997, I was transferred to the covert part of MDI. I remained there until I came to medical retirement from the service of the South African Police Service on 15 October 2001.
My commanders at the overt part of MDI were Brigadier Loots, then Colonel Roelf Venter, then Colonel Manie van Staden. My commander at the covert division was Superintendent (Lieutenant Colonel) Riaan van Schalkwyk.
My recruitment of informers and of JC Smit, one of the state witnesses in the "Boeremag Case":
13. In mid-1994, I identified several new informants for the purposes of recruiting them. I had to recruit new informants considering that there were almost no existing informants of whom I knew. It was a new field for me, and I tried to make a success of my task, purpose, and function, again from scratch.
14. In the process, I targeted and eventually recruited one Johan Smit, aka JC Smit, by persuading him to co-operate as an informant. He was then still working at Iscor (Edit: South African Iron & Steel Corporation), in the city of Vanderbijlpark. If he was already otherwise an informant, for example for Military Intelligence, I do not know to this day.
15. I did indeed know of JC Smit's alleged involvement in the AWB Ystergarde and in the car bombings of 1994 in Johannesburg and at Jan Smuts airport (Edit: now Oliver Tambo International). He was divorced and ideal to recruit as an informant.
16. The following is my knowledge and background information about JC Smit's activities as informant and finally as agent provocateur of the police among individuals and groups from the right (wing) environment during the period that my successor and I handled him.
JC Smit's operations and the beginning of the "Boeremag"-saga:
17. During 1996, JC Smit was much involved with one Kobus von Marle, when living in Doornpoort, Pretoria. Von Marle exposed JC Smit to people like the informant Jannie Smuts of the East Rand, who worked with Johan Niemoller.
About JC Smit, Jannie Smuts, Johan Niemoller, and Adriaan ("At") van Wyk, the following:
(A) I was informed by fellow members of MDI that one Jannie Smuts had worked for years with one Johan Niemoller, also at times in foreign countries (e.g. Angola) where illicit dealing in drugs, diamonds, and military equipment, were perpetrated.
In the same way, I also learned that Jannie Smuts was an informant for MDI. I later learned from Director Roos (Edit: director, then a senior SA Police Rank) that Johan Niemoller worked for military intelligence.
(B) In South Africa, especially at the beginning of the Boeremag investigation, Jannie Smuts was, according to my information, actively involved in Johan Niemoller's planning meetings; also with one Jan Viljoen. My information was that Jannie Smuts had reached agreement with his handlers that when the incitement of right-wingers to commit criminal acts, as I set out hereinafter, was well advanced, he and Johan Niemoller would be written out of (Edit: quietly removed from) from the Boeremag case.
(C) After I left the SAPS, JC Smit was placed under the management of Colonel Louis Pretorius. Pretorius wanted Adriaan (At) Van Wyk, one of the later accused in the Boeremag case, as an informant, but, according to what Pretorius told me in person, At (Edit: the common Afrikaans diminutive of Adriaan) did not accept.
Pretorius then, according to his disclosure to me, ordered evidence of criminal offenses or acts that could cause him (Adriaan van Wyk) embarrassment, to be made to be found in the possession of At Van Wyk, or for him to be linked to the Boeremag investigation in some way. They did not obtain anything concrete and then, according to what JC Smit told me, they lied about At van Wyk in statements to falsely incriminate him ("frame").
18. In early 1997, JC Smit told me that the above mentioned Von Marle spoke of meetings addressed by the aforementioned Johan Niemoller. The meetings were apparently aimed at getting a defense plan in place in case things should go wrong in South Africa, and that there already was a plan in place in which the commandos could intervene in such case - in the restoration of law and order in South Africa. Later, JC Smit told me an influential person, Oom Jan Viljoen, along with Niemoller, was involved in such meetings.
19. JC Smit was then ordered by me, and planning was done, to get in touch with Jan Viljoen, which was then done. I made the first reports of said meetings at the beginning of 1997, at our head office in Pretoria.
20. This was the beginning of the Boeremag saga.
The involvement of the SAPS Crime Intelligence Unit ("Mdi") and how the Mdi developed and managed the Boeremag
21. I had been following the reports described in paragraph 19 above, by head office senior police officers in our Intelligence Leg which monitors right-wing activities. Everyone wanted to know how, where, and in what way, I got my information, and how I could substantiate it.
22. This was followed by several sessions of planning how existing informers could and should infiltrate the new "right-wing activity". My information about the above activities was corroborated, largely by Jannie Smuts’ handlers Riaan van Schalkwyk and a policeman with the nickname "Strys". During that period Jannie Smuts suddenly began to plan and organize meetings with Jan Viljoen, for Niemoller.
23. At that stage Director Roos of MDI took over and began to control the project (to infiltrate the ranks of those who attend or arrange meetings, and to report on it). He wanted to know the how and the where of the origin of the actions that were discussed, because, according to him, Niemoller was not known as someone who planned and held meetings. According to Roos, Niemoller had no history of political activity, and he came from the ranks of Military Intelligence and Special Forces. Roos indicated that he suspected Niemoller of planning something illegal.
24. Director (now General) Mark Hankel began to attend our project meetings.
25. I started making enquiries with Superintendent Alfonso Theron, and everything pointed more and more towards the activities of Niemoller and company being orchestrated by a group with the pseudonym, Enlightened Action Group (VAG (Edit: the Afrikaans acronym)).
26. VAG was former Army and Police generals, and some former cabinet ministers, who drafted the above contingency plans. When I reported this, I was called in by Roos, who has ordered me to immediately discontinue the investigation of "VAG", and only to focus on my informant’s doings and on and guiding him.
27. From 1999, the information became all the more intense. The Head Office (Mdi) began arranging workshops where all Mdi members working countrywide on the right wing came together to discuss the new right-wing action and to plan how it should be driven and managed. I should mention that all major right-wing activities were, and are, infiltrated by and often covertly taken-over by, managed and driven by, the authorities, whether it be Security (SAPS), National Intelligence Agency ("NIA"), Military Intelligence, and the current South African Secret Service.
28. During 2000, the planning in Mdi began to mean that the right-wing actions of Johan Niemoller should be so managed that Mdi would be in total control of them. Informants were tasked specifically to be involved with specific people and actions. At the meetings, they had to address Document 12, to which I shall refer below, and to adapt it as necessary, to ensure that the so-called right-wingers would (Edit: be led to take certain) decisions which suited Mdi. They had to create the right culture and atmosphere so that other right-leaning people would also become involved.
Thereby, Mdi wanted to, and did, create an atmosphere whereby it seemed as if there was a threat to the country from a group of right-wingers even though it was in fact Mdi that brought them together and controlled them by covert means.
In this way, the Mdi handlers carried out the stated orders of their SAPS commanders via their informants, who now became agents provocateur (rather than mere informants) by virtue of these SAPS initiatives, and the Mdi handlers took over and directed the management and industry of right-wing activity without ordinary people who might have been involved apprehending (Edit: grasping, realising) it or knowing it.
They were literally led by their noses by the SAPS provocateurs and, where they did not agree with such guidance, the guidance was imposed upon them. In the process, many conservatives turned their backs on them, but the provocation was always finely-calculated to keep the remaining ones involved.
29. The Mdi-orchestrated meetings were being arranged more frequently to try to continuously influence right-leaning people. I, personally, found these developments more and more (Edit: morally) unjustifiable.
30. I wrote repeatedly in my reports to the Mdi headquarters that the right actions were never intended to take over the country but that from the beginning they simply wanted to create a defense mechanism aimed at intervening should things go drastically wrong in South Africa. I also stated that it was a consequence of the planning initiated by VAG.
31. My pleas fell on deaf ears and I began to alienate myself from some of my colleagues in the process. I was then given a final warning by Director Roos not to involve VAG (Edit: in conversations on the matter) and to limit myself to my assignments. In the process, I became overly-tense considering that I could see in what direction things were evolving. The role of provocateur being played by the SAPS upset me very much. Innocent people were being inflamed, used, and compromised in ways that seriously upset me. I had nowhere to complain, seeing as Mdi’s board was driving and managing this business.
32. I could not rape my soul any longer. In my statements and pleas, I collided with seniors and alienated them and I did not receive promotion, and I became even more tense, such I was boarded as medically unfit.
33. Although my final work date was October 15, 2001, due to a confluence of certain obligations, namely my family situation (by my marriage to Col. Miranda Loots, the “right hand man” of Gen. Hankel), actions by Col. Louis Pretorius and Hankel, and the influence of JC Smit and my wife, I remained abreast of Mdi activities concerning the Boeremag case’s investigation and subsequent saga, as described below.
34. Upon my retirement in 2001, General Hankel (when he still held the police rank of director) was already fully involved in the Boeremag project, which then became known, after my retirement, as "Project Wacko". He took over the planning thereof to manage and direct the right-wing activities, especially concerning the started orders, and the execution thereof, the informants who played such a huge provocateurs role. He openly bragged to me and my colleagues that it would become his "biggest baby".
35. Before politicians, Mdi (under Hankel and his fellow management) held out these right-wing activities as reason for the Commando system to be disbanded, seeing as, according to Mdi, the Commandos’ premises were being used for the right-wing meetings. No finger could be pointed towards any form of provocation by the police after they disbanded the Commando system. In the process, however, they destroyed a major crime prevention structure.
36. At a time (about 1998), a document was shown to me and some of my colleagues at MDI who worked on right wing, during a discussion at Mdi. The person who brought the document was Superintendent Riaan van Schalkwyk, our bureau chief (Intelligence, Gauteng). The entire office was present when the document was revealed. That was in the Johannesburg office. Alex Rakow (currently handler Jannie Smuts), Raymond Hayes and one "Strys", were, amongst others, present there. There were about 7 police officers and a typist present.
37. The document was then just 2 pages long and was set out in point format. In response to an order commissioned by van Schalkwyk, the typist then typed the document over onto the office computer.
38. I saw the document (Edit: with my own eyes); and noted that it addressed a plan such as elaborated in paragraph 18 above. We discussed it.
39. I saw the document at this occasion for the first time ever.
40. The document had no title and it was only two pages long. Previously, reporters referred to a document that Niemoller had addressed at meetings as "Document 12". The document that I mention in paragraph 36, was also called "Document 12" by Van Schalkwyk. After the meeting, the head office demanded that we meet once a month to monitor the development of the right-wing activities. The first meeting was merely an information meeting. We then had to go and determine how widely the plan had been disseminated.
41. At following meetings Mdi officials of the Western Cape and Eastern Cape reported that there was no such (Edit: right-wing planning/meeting activity) occurring in their regions. Transvaal, Free State and Natal Mdi officials reported that such (similar planning meetings) had occurred there.
42. A large Mdi meeting was held at Bloemhof. That was around about early 1998. During that meeting, off to one side, Director Roos ordered a small group of Mdi members including me to adapt "Document 12" to create something of publicity value, to promote our (Mdi’s) interests and survival - we had to adapt it so that it looked like a document in which a coup d’état was being planned.
43. I, Werner Smit, and Riaan van Schalkwyk represented Gauteng there. We decided that each one of we three handlers should create his own document so that our informants could not be caught out. Each paragraph's contents needn’t agree verbatim, but the thinking in the (Edit: various versions of the) document had to be adapted to indicate the planning of a coup d’état.
44. I ordered JC Smit to propose at all the meetings of the right-wingers that the document should be further and further adapted towards offensiveness – to suggest preparation being made for a right-wing coup d’état.
45. The Mdi let those meetings be set up bt their informants.
46. For one such meeting at Kathu, a cellular telephone was installed by technicians in JC Smit's car and adapted so that it could be constantly heard (tapped). Then, when JC Smit gave some right-wingers lifts to the meeting, I and some colleagues, including Colonel Louis Pretorius, could hear what they discussed in the car on the way.
47. Similarly, we often lured people who hosted meetings away from their homes, or waited until they were not at home, to install listening devices into their furniture.
48. As I said above, I and other members of MDI changed the initial Document 12 from a defensive document into an offensive document.
49. I even made changes to Document 12 on the Mdi office’s portable state-owned computer and it was discussed in meetings with members of the South African Police Service's headquarters, such as Captain "Kuifie"  Fouche, Superintendent Jan Meyer, Director Roos and Superintendent Alfonso Theron, who also made their own changes.
50. They then gave the altered text to informants such as Jannie Smuts, and they in turn gave it to people like Niemoller and Jan Viljoen. So, too, was it later given to Mike du Toit (a later-accused in the Boeremag case). Many MDI-SAPS members worked on it and made adjustments to it. No single person would be the author of the final version.
51. A host of information was thus fabricated by the MDI to make the right-wing activities appear more dangerous than they really were. A certain Tollie Vreugdenburg was ultimately appointed the Principal Investigator in the Boeremag case, under the authority of Colonel Louis Bester, but (according to my wife), not all the information concerning how and where the orchestration originated was ever given to Vreugdenburg and Bester. I do not know exactly what all they knew or what they believed to be the truth.
52. General Mark Hankel often boasted to me that he was able to, and had indeed managed to, outwit the other intelligence institutions of the state and that he was the real brains behind Project Wacko.
53. Upon my retirement I conveyed to JC Smit my opinion that he too should retire. By that stage, under orders from the MDI, I had wormed JC Smit deep into the orchestrated right-wing activities so that he could implement the MDI assignments, spread MDI-orchestrated information, give and take the lead as required, and could direct management i.e. could influence people with orders that accorded with Mdi, prompt things to be said in meetings, to plan, to ensure the realization of plans, or to compromise (the realization of) plans (which did not accord with Mdi’s ambitions), as needed.
54. Handlers are trained to manipulate informants to do things as the handlers so desire, mainly to obtain information, but those skills of manipulation can be abused for the goals of provocation, as often happens, and which was the technique employed in project Wacko.
55. The handlers are also trained get informants to carry out orders they receive. This includes influencing members of the public. Informants don’t always know what it is that they are really involved in carrying out.
56. Hankel and Roos did not want to get rid of JC Smit when I retired. They wanted me to transfer him to a handler in Gauteng but I knew no one in Gauteng who was suitable and I said as much to them.
57. They wanted me to hand him over to Colonel Louis Pretorius of Klerksdorp, since he was also well-connected (Edit: presumably, well-connected to the right-wing infiltration effort). JC Smit initially refused and suggested that I should continue to handle him - under Pretorius. So, Pretorius would handle me, and I JC Smit, on a sub-handler base. I agreed, on the understanding that I would be phased out as soon as possible. My inner motivation for phasing out was that I wanted to have nothing more to do with the lies and self-enriching orchestrations.
58. The typical fashion within the MDI is that, during the course of their employments, MDI members tend to become legally-compromised by the nature of their activities, resulting in them being the potential victims of intimidation or fear of disclosure; therefore, they end up having to do everything, both legal and illegal, that is expected of them; or leave the SAPS. I consistently circumvented such compromises but in the course of my work I was indeed involved with uncomfortable aspects of orders I had to execute. I therefore considered myself vulnerable but not to the point that it was self-destructive.
Worse, however, was the MDI practice of falsely incriminating (framing) colleagues and former colleagues, with devastating consequences, such that it eventually became my biggest fear. I could not under-estimate these risks. Therefore, I did executed my assignments and, following my retirement in 2001, requests made to me by officers in charge of Project Wacko, as completely as possible or addressed them with a gradual phasing out.
59. All of the involved MDI-SAPS members who were involved believed they were going to get promotions because their standing with the ANC government would (naturally) rise. There was an assumption that here was an opportunity for great financial benefit and enrichment with new vehicles and accessories from the secret fund for the police.
60. Any inquiry will indicate the number of state vehicles that are registered in the private names of individual SAPS MDI members and used as private property. Examples consisted of, for example, a motor vehicle, motorcycle, bus, trailer - all state property – in the same individual SAPS MDI members' names. It is obviously extremely difficult to audit and manage, as everything is handled covertly. An audit of SAPS MDI members' names on the vehicle registration system through all the years up to this time, will indicate the current state of affairs, and what it has been from time to time over the years, over the years, and whether all state property has been accounted and returned to the state. I know that it usually was not.
61. When the Boeremag-accused Jan Rudolf ("Rudi") Gouws and Herman van Rooyen were hiding in the Nylstroom area, they were tracked down by rangers, who then reported the matter. The MDI did not arrest them but rather got the SAPS Task Force, who watched them for more than a month and arrested them, so that the Mdi members could (buy themselves enough time to) obtain vehicles and equipment for themselves out of the slush fund under the pretext that it was bought to make them fit in with the ordinary members of the community – for the sake of the planned arrest.
Some Important Events Around the Boeremag Case
62. The state-orchestrated explosives training of Boeremag accused (all preparations were planned by Hankel, Pretorius and Miranda Loots):
62.1 According to what he shared with me, Colonel Louis Pretorius obtained specially-prepared explosives from the explosives factory (as he called it) outside Klerksdorp.
62.2 In my house in Pretoria, JC Smit was shown by Pretorius and an unknown person how the explosives work and how it should be used to blow up certain specific things. I myself do not know explosives and could not participate in the discussion, so I just listened. There, JC Smit was also shown how to combine the components of explosives to make the final product. According to JC Smit, explosive components were then given to him at a later date by Louis Pretorius with the order that he should go and train some men (like Herman van Rooyen who was eventually arrested near Waverley and later became an accused in the Boeremag Case) how to make explosives and how to use them. In the above training session, I objected to Louis Pretorius over it, and said it was illegal. He assured me that the explosive components that he would give JC Smit would not be powerful enough to truly do harm.
62.3 Later, on a different day, JC Smit arrived at my place with explosive components in his car, which, he claimed, he had to take to Warmbaths. He was afraid he would be caught with the stuff in his car and would land up in deep trouble. We knew that he had no disclaimer, just as Pretorius also confirmed to me by telephone when I called him to ask about it. Pretorius made it clear that it was "for the cause" and that the case (Edit: against the later Boeremag accused) had to be built urgently, meaning that evidence against the Boeremag had to be orchestrated as severely and quickly as possible, so that even the general public would turn against the Boeremag and against right-wingers generally.
I also confronted my wife about this. She made it seem as if she and Hankel had everything well under control, and was aware of what was going on. This incident made me once again convinced that unjust provocations were concerned, of which I would take no part.
62.4 My order from Pretorius was to drive behind JC Smit with the explosives to Warmbaths and to hand them over to him there, which is what happened. He left there, where to I do not know, and I did not want to know, because it was all unethical and wrong. However, I waited for Smit until he joined me again late that night, whereupon he gave me back the superfluous explosives and we went back to Pretoria to my house. There we talked at length and I explained to him that he was just as guilty as the guys that he had just trained, and that he had to withdraw.
My Continued Involvement and Knowledge
63. At this time, I repeatedly told my wife, Colonel Pretorius, and General Hankel that they were inciting crime and that they were engaging innocent people solely for their own benefit. Loots and Hankel laughed it off. Pretorius became surly at my attitude. He increasingly insisted to JC Smit that he should ignore me completely and completely cut me out of his doings because I didn’t want to co-operate/play along, which would indeed happen with time. However, for a long time Smit continued to discuss many things with me and to ask me for advice.
64. I remained well-informed by Colonel Miranda Loots (my wife) and Hankel:
64.1 My wife often discussed Mdi activities and plans with me. Hankel also did so on occasion. On these occasions, I observed that they had, in my opinion, tunnel vision and they did not take my efforts (Edit: to get them out of that tunnel) to heart. They were obsessed with "framing" and proceeding with arrests of the right-wing as rapidly as possible, but they were apparently afraid of making mistakes and openly discussed the case with me, supposedly for further ideas and insights. It should be remembered that I trained my wife in the police and gave her much guidance and that she also viewed me as her mentor.
64.2 They held several such discussions with me, especially by telephone. My wife especially held such discussions with me after hours.
64.3 In this process, I repeatedly advised – especially my wife, to stop inciting the Boeremag because, in my opinion, everything could blow up in their faces one day.
My wife and I had been separated in bed and board since 2008 and we are still engaged in a protracted contested divorce. Despite this, she held such discussions with me until 2010. Hankel (with a lot of help, especially from my wife) organized and paid for the following regarding the two escapees in the Boeremag case:
65. My wife fully informed me about this while I helped her with it. When it was finally decided that the two escapees Rudi Gouws and Herman van Rooyen would be arrested, there was a former policeman, who was simultaneously a police agent, with whom it was arranged that he would take the two to an apartment in Centurion as an alleged "safe haven" where they could continue to hide. My job (at the request of my wife) was to buy groceries for the apartment to make it look as plausible as possible when the two showed up there with the agent.
Everything was already in place for them to be arrested the following morning by the police Task Force. Everything was planned and arranged (“staged”) precisely, long before the time. Afterwards the very same agent in question received R450,000 in cash (i.e. un-taxed and untraceable). An agent may not receive additional rewards, but Hankel approved the money and it was paid as cash to him a week after the arrests, and no fingers could be pointed or questions asked. My wife had shown me the money at our house showed prior to the money being paid over.
The Waverley Arrests
66. With the arrests of the wanted suspects in Waverley, Pretoria, Sergeant "Sam" Theron (my one sister's ex-husband), according to him, they had known for so-to-speak a week that the suspects were using a particular house as their home and as a place from which they were planning to commit crimes. This planning was apparently already discussed with reporter Otto Gerner and known to MDI. According to Theron, they were not arrested sooner because of worries that Gerner would be compromised, and because they wanted to catch them in possession of explosives.
The Statements of Witnesses in the Boeremag case.
67. Prior to the arrests in the Boeremag case, Colonel Louis Pretorius invited me to Hartbeespoort Dam, along with one Karen, and a Colonel "Sollie", to set up the state witnesses’ statements to ensure that they were not contradictory. I refused. JC Smit told me that almost none of the state witnesses ever made their own witness statements while the documents were being drafted, but that the documents were largely drafted by Colonel Louis Pretorius and then periodically adjusted by him to correspond with other statements.
According to JC Smit, with the co-operation of Lt. Col. Vreugdenburg, only when all the statements corresponded to each other and all facts and allegations followed chronologically and were consistent, were they submitted to the witness for signature, whereupon all had to learn them like parrots. They were therefore not the statements of the witnesses but rather of the MDI-SAPS members (especially Pretorius and Vreugdenburg).
68. In 2001 (possibly 2002 - I cannot remember the dates exactly) Colonel Pretorius required of me and JC Smit to write research statements in the police docket for the prosecution in the Boeremag case. I - and I believe JC Smit - knew it to be unethical and dishonest to make the required statements, to offer evidence, or to continue in any way have to have anything to do with the Boeremag case. I refer below to the "stated reasons" for the objections of me and JC Smit when we, as discussed below, refused to make statements, to give evidence, or to have further involvement in the Boeremag case.
69. Both JC Smit and I had initially - due to the reasons mentioned, had objections to taking statements or giving evidence in the case and wanted nothing further to do with the matter.
70. Colonel Louis Pretorius, however, applied duress upon JC Smit to make/write the necessary affidavit regarding his (JC Smit's) share in and of the Boeremag saga. Colonel Pretorius threatened him and said that, should he not make the required statement and act as a state witness, he would be arrested and charged along with the Boeremag suspects.
71. I was also placed under duress by Louis Pretorius to make the required statement and provide the subsequent evidence (Edit: evidence in court, as a witness), but I stood by my refusal for the aforementioned reasons.
72. Both I and JC Smit informed Colonel Pretorius very clearly of our objections due to the above reasons. The pressure on me and JC Smit, however, was increased to such an extent in response to our continued denials that we felt so threatened that we decided to seek legal advice.
73. I knew lawyer Piet Breedt, one of my former colleagues, and, along with JC Smit, I decided that we would approach him for legal advice via Tom van Rensburg, who also made the appointment for us. JC Smit and I then went to consult Piet Breedt at his offices in Bosman Street, Pretoria.
74. We shared, fully, with him our refusals for the aforementioned reasons and his response was that the matter was so serious in nature that he had to involve advocate Johan Gaum, also a former colleague, in the consultations and handling of the case for the sake of his (Gaum’s) knowledge and guidance. This was done and so one night (I cannot remember the exact date) we went with Piet Breedt to Guam’s offices for official consultation.
75. JC Smit and I informed advocate Gaum and Piet Breedt in detail how the Boeremag case had been orchestrated by the police’s Mdi and of our refusals for the aforementioned reasons.
76. Advocate (edit note: lawyer for Americans) Gaum listened to us and asked many probing questions. Eventually, he indicated that my position was much better than JC Smit’s, as he (Smit) was an actual instigator in the development of the Boeremag case therefore his share in things was very serious, especially with regard to indemnity. Advocate Gaum would represent JC Smit in the matter, and he would stand by me should the State try to force me to make the required statement or to testify accordingly.
77. Furthermore Advocate Gaum said that, in the meantime, Piet Breedt should begin preparing the documents for JC Smit's application since it would be problematic to keep JC Smit from the Boeremag trial.
78. Advocate Gaum and Piet Breedt were thus relatively-comprehensively informed of the reasons (Edit: the whole story). Gaum advised to persist in our refusals and to exercise our rights to remain silent.
79. The cost of this first appointment on this night with Gaum amounted to R4 000, which was paid by JC Smit.
80. JC Smit and I discussed the costs of legal representation with one another after the consultation was over and, since neither of us had the financial means for it, neither of us could afford further legal representation.
81. According to JC Smit's regular discussions with me, he was overly-intimidated by Colonel Pretorius and, so, with promises of generous compensation (if he would cooperate by making the statement and giving evidence), he finally agreed to make a statement and to act as a state witness.
82. According to JC Smit's regular conversations with me, Colonel Pretorius drafted JC Smit’s statement, in the Hartebeespoort Dam area, just as he (Pretorius) wanted the matter to be portrayed and to accord with other statements, after which simply presented it to Smit for the latter’s signature and Smit signed without being in any way involved with the formulation and nothing was permitted to be changed.
83. I myself, however, consistently refused, to the chagrin of Pretorius, to give any statement.
84. A relatively long time after consultation with counsel Gaum, at first Hankel, and then my wife, told me that prosecutor Paul Fick SC wanted to speak to me regarding my involvement in the whole run-up to the Boeremag case and they as it were pestered me to consult Fick in his chambers.
85. Although I initially refused, the pressure was so great upon me that I finally agreed to speak one time with advocate Fick. I saw the interview as much as anything as an opportunity for the real version (Edit: to come out, to be told, for once), as I had experienced it and to discuss with the senior prosecutor my reasons for refusing to make a statement or to testify in the trial.
86. My wife took me to the Palace of Justice in Pretoria where Tollie Vreugdenburg met me at the gate in Vermeulen Street and then took me to the office of advocate Fick SC in the bottom of the building.
87. There I met Fick whom I previously did not know. Advocate Pieter Luyt (whom I already knew, since both of us ran for Acacia Athletic Club) and a woman advocate (whom I did not know and whose name I cannot remember, but who was apparently one of the assistant-advocates on the Government's team of prosecutors) were also present, as well as Colonel Vreugdenburg.
88. The team (with advocate Fick SC speaking the most) initially tried to persuade me to make a statement and testify in the case. They repeatedly said that I would retire from the case with great honor. With time, in a threatening manner, they tried to compel me to make a statement in the Boeremag case. The aggression and domineering manner that the team revealed towards me was unbearable. Advocate Fick SC threatened that I could be prosecuted as an accomplice in the Boeremag case if I did not give my cooperation by making a statement and witnessing.
89. However, based upon the above reasons, I persisted in my refusal. I repeatedly explained to them that it was unfair and unethical to influence people and to incite them to engage in crime and then, as soon as the people's orchestrated actions had progressed far enough, to arrest and charge such indeed-innocent people.
90. I repeatedly made it very clear that the involved legal personnel were actually busy with defensive planning for assisting the South African Police in the event of unrest and riots but that MDI had itself turned it into an offensive action and had involved innocent people, had involved them in prosecutable crime, and had even falsely incriminated (framed) many, and I could no longer tolerate it and could not participate further in it.
91. The sustained pressure upon me and their refusal to understand my reasons, ultimately led to a big falling out between me and the aforementioned others, in which tempers began to flare.
92. From the beginning, the three advocates and Colonel Vreugdenburg ganged up on me and I, who always stood alone, was increasingly intimidated with great aggression and I was threatened. It was one of the most distressing events of my life.
93. I constantly repeated the above reasons for my refusal and I stood by my refusal, whereupon they became even more aggressive. In the process, I eventually suggested to them that big politics must be behind this orchestration and that this must be the political toy of senior police officers, something that I didn’t like it and of which I didn’t want any part, namely that it was the activity of "Broederbonders" or something like that, and I made it clear that I wanted to remove myself form the entire conversation. (I made the statement in dismay after I heard from someone - shortly prior to the above conversation - that Colonel Louis Pretorius and Director Roos were both members of a secret society, and that Pretorius was jealous because he was Roos's senior in the organisation, but his junior in the SAPS. I took it to be a reference to the Broederbond, therefore I passed this comment).
94. The interview was thus ended with hard feelings and we parted with hard feelings, too. During the closing moments, Advocate Fick SC snarled at me that A) I would not be welcome when the trial began and that I would not be allowed to attend the trial, unless I decide to cooperate and B) and that under no circumstances may I attempt to communicate with the defense team as I was under oath of secrecy and that I would be prosecuted if I spoke to them.
95. I then withdrew myself from the conversation, left there, and never had anything more to do with advocate Fick. I did see advocate Luyt afterwards at running events, but we did not talk about official things.
96. Indeed, initially I did not attend the trial, even though I was consistently opposed to the matter. However, my wife kept me constantly informed of the matter until we were separated.
97. Because of my oath of secrecy and the threat of prosecution by Adv Fick SC, initially I did not make contact with the defense teams. I believed there was no ointment to be smeared on this unethical affair, except to write a book one day, notwithstanding the oath of secrecy, so that the public could be informed of the true background. (Later on, I was advised by counsel Gaum via Tom van Rensburg that I acted correctly in speaking with counsel Fick SC and in telling him that I did not want to be a witness in the case.)
98. In 2005, I and a former friend and former colleague, Alphons Theron, who also worked on the Boeremag intelligence, speculated about someday writing a book about the Boeremag case, but we never did.
99. In 2011 I left the country to go in India to work, where to my dismay concerning the fate of the accused in the Boeremag Case got control of my mind. I returned to South Africa, among other reasons to try to seek another opportunity to expose the true state of affairs.
100. Upon my return, I firstly tried to attend the trial to try to assess the progress in the case.
101. On my first visit to the court, I ended up next to court reporter Karin Labuschagne of Radio Jacaranda, whom I did not know at the time. Before the start of the court session, Colonel T Vreugdenburg approached me and asked what I was doing there and he told me that I knew full well that I was not allowed to be there. I refused to go out and asked him for it to be presented to me in writing that I was not permitted to be there, or that the judge should order me to leave the courtroom.
102. Colonel Vreugdenburg spoke to advocates Fick SC and Luyt and the trial was adjourned after only about 10 minutes of sitting. Advocate Luyt approached me and asked me how I was keeping and what I wanted there. I told him that I want to ascertain what is happening in the case. He asked that I rather not come again.
103. After the court session adjourned, Karin Labuschagne introduced herself to me and asked who and what I was, and why people did not want me there. I explained briefly to her briefly who I am and then left the court premises.
104. About a week later, just before the 2011 Comrades Marathon, during a coffee meeting of about two hours, I gave Karin Labuschagne a relatively detailed synoptic view of, and my position on, the Boeremag case, as well as mentioning my refusals and my stated reasons therefore, and my proposed book and the reasons for it. She was enthusiastic about such a book and very much wanted the rights for it and to be given the task of writing it, so that everything might be uncovered. She said she had already done her own research for a book.
105. We decided to go and attend the court session together and again I was confronted by Colonel Vreugdenburg, where-after a police officer who was unknown to me came and sat behind me during the rest of the sitting.
106. The case was soon postponed.
107. After the case was postponed and the court adjourned, I approached advocate Louisa van der Walt and Harry Prinsloo and gave them my details.
108. I also informed them that I could give background information to them and that everyone was being eavesdropped by the police, everywhere in the court and in the cells, and invited them to contact me so that I could give them the relevant information in detail. They did not contact me.
109. From time-to-time, Karin Labuschagne and I had contact again.
110. Afterwards, I was informed by people working at Mdi that my phone calls were being tapped by MDI and that my text messages and my e-mail messages were being monitored by MDI, and I laid a charge on the matter, whereupon Colonel Werner Smit and Colonel Eugene Pitout of Mdi visited me on two occasions and asked me about it. They then informed that they knew that I wanted to cleanse my heart over the Boeremag saga and repeatedly threatened me that I would be charged and prosecuted if I said anything, exposed anything, wrote a book about it, seeing as I was still bound by my oath of secrecy.
Eavesdropping on the Arrests of the Accused
111. According to my wife, strenuous efforts were made to obtain a legal order to listen-in on the accused in their cells, but the judge summarily rejected the application very soon after the arrests, to great dismay within MDI.
112. However, on behalf of Mdi, General Hankel unilaterally insisted upon it, gave orders for it, and arranged that it should be implemented and commissioned, and gave orders for the right person in Correctional Services to be found to help MDI to obtain access so that tapping devices could be installed. According to my wife, on several occasions Hankel and she went to speak to one Mr Zack Modise and, at times, one Kenny Bouwer at Correctional Services headquarters. Through discreet inquiries I received confirmation that the latter person was Mdi’s contact within the Department of Correctional Services for unlawful access to the cells in question and that authorization and access could be given by him for the unlawful installation of the eavesdropping equipment when the detainees were at court or at times when they could leave their cells.
113. According to my wife, Col. Miranda Loots, one Andre Storm at C-Max prison was involved in (Edit: giving) access there.
114. From the beginning of the court proceedings, everyone at MDI constantly wanted to know what was being discussed between the accused and their lawyers but, to Mdi’s distress, no permission at all could be obtained to monitor it.
115. According to my wife, General Hankel could not accept this. According to her, at that time he even went to the United States, and it is my understanding that he acquired the necessary equipment there. According to my wife, just after the start of the case very sensitive video and audio equipment was installed for the monitoring of the entire courtroom and the consultation rooms.
116. In fact, on two occasions I entered the headquarters of Mdi, in Prieska Street in Erasmuskloof, where the so-called CINOC (Crime Intelligence Nodal Operational Centre), also known as the "War Room", was pointed out to me by my wife. Both occasions were in 2008, the first time was prior to my foot surgery for the Comrades Marathon race. The site was not like it is today. The second time was was quite some time after my operation, perhaps early the next year. I was taken by my wife, Colonel Miranda Loots ("Miranda"), who wanted to show me, or brag to me, about how advanced was the system that had been created under General Hankel for eavesdropping and monitoring. I cannot remember the exact dates. I only know that on the first occasion the centre was, according to my impressions, very nicely furnished with a bunch of TV screens/monitors. On the following occasion the center was more expanded with more screens and it was more neatly laid out.
117. On both occasions it was after hours and on weekends, when minimal numbers of members of staff were in the offices, so that I would not attract attention. Miranda said that it would be impossible in the week because there were too many people present, but that General Hankel had knowledge of my presence.
118. In both cases Miranda activated something on a computer in the CINOC, on which she then showed, step-by-step, the Boeremag detainees climbing from a Nyala, walking towards us as we looked at the screen, and turning left into a doorway. Miranda then said “That's where you enter the court cells”. Then, I saw on the screen how the people entered by a door and on the next screen I saw cells' bars.
119. The next video recording was of where the accused stood and chatted in the cells. It was just the Boeremag detainees alone. Then she went quickly through various recordings and then boasted, "Look, here the detainees are consulting with their lawyers." People I was able to recognize from the image recording were, among others, advocates Louisa van der Walt and Harry Prinsloo, who consulted individually with inmates. I did not recognize any of the accused. One could see everything clearly at all times and the sound was very clear, such that you could clearly hear what the lawyers and inmates were discussing with one another. In the portions of the recording during which they consulted, one could only see a white wall and a corner of the room. On the other screen was another white wall with a portion of the bars. The images were taken from above, from the roof's edge (Edit: ceiling’s edge). All of these images were recorded and not live broadcasts.
120. Then Miranda pointed again and said that if the defendants “walk up just behind here, to the right” then, according to her, they’d go up by the stairway into the courtroom. Miranda then pointed to the screen's right. In my view there weren’t any cameras on the stairs, because I never saw the stairs (Edit: anywhere on the screens). Then Miranda showed footage inside the courtroom itself. I could only see the section where the accused sit and where the lawyers sit or stand. I could not see the judge’s bench and the gallery but Miranda told me that the whole of the courtroom could be seen with other cameras.
121. My wife said wherever the accused went, these movements were covered by cameras and sound recording equipment, even beyond the courtroom itself. There was a room with a table and chairs on one of the video recordings. This room was right across from the courtroom, according to Miranda, with a window overlooking Vermeulen Street. Here, only the image recording was clear. The sound of the recording was unclear on both of the occasions (Edit: that I visited the war room). However, in the second-to-last week of May 2011, I was in the court building for the first time and I could observe a room directly across from the entrance to the courtroom.
122. The other occasions on which I saw images were also in 2008/2009:
At this time, I saw images on Miranda’s official Nokia cell phone on at least two occasions. They were live broadcasts (Edit: direct to the cell phone) and Miranda boasted how advanced their technology was at Mdi. If Miranda wanted to look at different images (Edit: live video images), she to go out of the current one each time then click on another camera's image, which had to be given brief moments’ chance to load, which continuously froze for brief moments and then she had to wait again for it to be activated for her to be able to continue to watch the footage live.
123. Miranda also boasted to me several times about the technology that was used by MDI. She boasted a lot about everything and repeatedly laughed about the detainees while footage while she showed me video footage on her laptop in our house, and referred to them as "fucking assholes". Each time the camera angles in the various rooms were the same. According to Miranda, the purpose was that MDI wanted to record everything to always know what's going on.
They wanted to monitor everything, especially everything that was discussed and planned by the accused and their lawyers, especially during their consultation sessions, because they could, inter alia, know what plans the defense was laying and what questions would be asked in cross-examination.
124. Miranda boasted very much that Mdi was always a step ahead of the defense because they recorded everything and thereby saw and heard all of the accused and their lawyers’ planning in advance.
125. According to Miranda, everything was monitored when the lawyers consulted with their respective clients. According to her, several cameras - with audio – showed everything live in "CINOC" (or sometimes the "war room") and the sound was played, too. The MDI-SAPS members monitored everything at all times and they knew all that was discussed, done, and planned by the defense. It enabled the MDI SAPS members enabled to plan counter-actions, counter-evidence, or suitable answers, with direct communication thereof to advocate Paul Fick SC and/or his team members.
126. On several occasions, Miranda told her sister Maxine and my daughter, in my presence, that Mdi expected questions of the defense heard on recordings. Then they quickly determined answers to certain questions from their computers, but for other questions they jointly concocted explanations. According to her, normally Tollie Vreugdenburg or Louis Bester (she also sometimes spoke of a certain "Vice") immediately called CINOC and relayed their messages concerning an anticipate defense question and the recommended answer. That was then immediately relayed back to the State's legal team to ensure that they would be ready should it (Edit: the anticipated question) be raised in court. Miranda expressly said that the information was given directly to the State's legal team by Mdi.
127. In each case, Miranda showed me these recordings – both image and audio - at my house in Rietfontein, Pretoria, except the two times to Erasmuskloof in "CINOC". The occasions on which I saw them were between 2008 and 2010 prior to the FIFA World Cup Football Tournament. Specifically, one of the occasions was when I happened to be barbecuing. My daughter and my wife's sister, Maxine, were also there.
The Monitoring of Detainees at C-Max
128. Miranda told me that a high-ranking officer of DCS (Department of Correctional Services) was approached, on false authority, by Hankel and herself to have monitoring equipment installed in the prison where the Boeremag detainees were being held. “Fortunately, they managed to hold” the people whom they approached for their and for the department's cooperation; in other words, they were bribed.
129. According to Miranda, at C-Max, a room – a consultation room – apparently near the entrance or diagonally above the entrance, was made available to Mdi where all the equipment that made monitoring possible was stored. That was from early-2003/2004, seeing as Miranda, Hankel, and Sam Theron had already boasted to me about it from that time.
130. It was long-boasted to me by Miranda that MDI knew all that happened in the cells and everything that the detainees got up to. According to her, there was much laughing and joking about the men's private and personal things, such as where they would change and the like.
131. Miranda repeatedly boasted to me that MDI did not possess authority for the monitoring, that it was done “hot”, and that nobody else knew that it would take place.
Over the Bugging of Suspects and Their Families
132. According to Miranda, EVERYONE in the Boeremag matter is being tapped, even their close friends and family. From land lines at homes, cellular ‘phones, conversations, SMSes, and e-mails, to their very movements - everything is monitored. Some of the eavesdropping is legal - under authorisation, but much is illegal and without authority.
133. Thus there were two occasions whereby Nelmari, accused Herman van Rooyen's ex-wife, went on a week's holiday to La Cote d'Azur in Margate, where she was haunted by members of Mdi and where the people of CTC (Counter Terrorism Centre, also a part of MDI) happened to be gathered. I happened to be with my wife Miranda in Margate, during the October school holidays, and on one occasion I went to sit with Nelmarie van Rooyen on the beach and a chat entered into a chat with her. For this I was severely chastised by Miranda and Sam Theron. They relayed a message to me that Director Roos was very upset about it.
134. According to Miranda, most eavesdropping is and remains done without authorization.
DEPONENT: Deon LOOTS
Signed and sworn at Pretoria on this day of January 2013 by the deponent who declares that he is familiar with the contents of this affidavit and that it is true and correct; he has no objection to taking the prescribed oath and he considers the prescribed oath binding upon his conscience; in fulfillment of the provisions of the regulations as contained in Government Notices R1258, R1648, and R1428
 The renowned, and once extremely large, right wing organization Afrikaner Resistance Movement’s putatively-elite Iron Guard
 During apartheid South Africa possessed a nationwide system of civilian militia, called Commandos, under the command of the Defence Force. This commando system remained until after apartheid and was often used to protect vulnerable farmers in South Africa’s farm murder epidemic following the African National Congress/Nelson Mandela’s assumption of power. It was shut down by the government as a result of events described in this affidavit. Indeed, it is generally believed that these events were, at least partially, specifically intended to provide a long-sought pretext for the closure of the commandos because they were overwhelmingly white-dominated and thus perceived to be a potential tool for insurrection against the New South Africa, as the post-1994 system is colloquially known.
 Apartheid South Africa had a proud tradition of some of the finest special forces in the world. Therefore, amongst white South Africans, even post-apartheid, former special forces operators (as they are called in SA) were held in high esteem. Therefore, Director Roos didn’t class Niemoller as a political agitator, intellectual speaker, or rabble-rouser but rather he instinctively suspected him, as a soldier and man of action, of plotting actual insurrectionist activities at these meetings
 Cf. paragraph 18
 The reader should recognise the importance of this insider’s knowledge. Capt. Loots’s claim is that the state apparatus of the New South Africa has utterly infiltrated, and dominates, all right-wing organisations.
 In this case, translating the sentence would have demanded far too much interpolation to sustain the spirit of honesty which the translators have endeavoured to employ. The point which is clear in the original is that Mdi specifically wanted to bait as many (non-participant/peripheral) right-leaning people (the actual term used by Loots is right-thinkers) as possible. The implication is that the more right-leaning people they could induce to participate in these plans, the more successful they (Mdi) would be deemed to be. It wasn’t about “catching baddies” or even about inventing a few baddies and a plot – in order to say that they had done their jobs; it was all about orchestrating as great a plot as they could and framing as many people as they possibly could, and reaping the concomitant rewards of the very scale of their achievement. See later references to extra-salarium illegal payouts to the “framers”.
 The clear implication here is “These chaps are not the head of this supposed threat. Never mind that this is all a concoction; even so, you are directing your attentions, wrongfully, against people who would, in any case, by no means be the genuine instigators”.
 Capt. Loots is suggesting that once the police had removed the evidence of the police’s provocation of the entire affair – by ensuring the disbanding of the Commandos, no-one would ever be able to claim later-on that it was the police, via police informants and agents, who’d been the very ones to arrange all of, certainly all of the latter, meetings at the Commandos’ premises. Without a national Commando system, without the long-gone buildings, telephone lines, records e.g. log books, and personnel, to serve as witnesses against the police, it would be difficult for anyone to construct a plausible evidence-based case for the police’s orchestration of the years-long saga.
 Capt. Loots is implying that Document 12 would be infiltrated into the right-wing meetings by the police’s agents, then exposed to reveal a coup d’etat conspiracy. Therefore, to avoid clear evidence of a “too good to be true” common link between agents from far-and-wide across Gauteng Province - all presenting identical versions of Document 12, there should be variety in the versions. That variety would imply that people with the same militant-ideological agenda, but not somehow collaborating with one another, had each come up with their own ideas on how the coup d’etat should be executed.
 Kuifie means fringe or forelock in English and it is employed like the French term is employed for the eponymous Belgian cartoon character Tintin.
 Alternatively, “not to the point of self-destruction”
 A gradual reduction in the diligence and conscientiousness with which the requests were met by him
 Notwithstanding the following paragraphs(s) it is difficult to conclude explicitly whether, in this paragraph, Capt. Loots means that the presence of new vehicles and accessories implied that there would be enough money going around for self-enrichment, too, or whether he means that the new vehicles and accessories seemed, in themselves, to offer an opportunity for illicit gain (theft, back market sale, thereof) especially because they were off the books - and thus less susceptible to control and audit. Finally, he could just mean that the members foresaw that the secret fund would provide nicer cars for the department (although the presence of the words financial advantage and enrichment seem to render it unlikely that he is referring to colleagues’ mutual altruistic concern for the welfare of the department). Given the stories which have emerged over recent years of massive plunder (hundreds-upon-hundreds of millions, yearly) of South Africa’s State Security-type agencies it seems most reasonable to conclude, if one feels forced to attempt a conclusion, that one of the two former scenarios is most probable.
 Two of the Boeremag accused escaped during the trial and were recaptured
 There have been, and are, a number of explosives and explosives-related factories in the vicinity of the mining town of Klerksdorp
 “Legal excuse” would be a correct umbrella term.
 Presumably unused in the training he was to have given
 Bearing in mind that the police would have employed one of their own properties for the purpose, they had to make it appear like a genuine “home” of sorts.
 The South African Police (formal title – South African Police Service) Task Force for special operations was once a source of great nationalistic pride among whites because of its reputation and competence during the period when the entire society was under assault by terrorism and indeed simply because law and order were much valued in the old conservative South Africa. Even today, it retains some of the cachet of the past.
 In strictly exchange-rate terms, R450, 000 would have been worth about U.S. $70,000 in 2001. In purchasing power parity terms, it would have been worth significantly more. Bear in mind that this payment was merely for the retired policemen to entice the two fugitives to a flat; not more than a week or two’s work all told, and on top of his salary as an agent for the police.
 In other words, perhaps not literally a full week
 This person is unknown to the translators.
 Situation or condition, rather than attitude
 Loots seems to be suggesting that some sort of an application would have to be brought before a court, or submitted to Mdi, to keep JC Smit from being obliged to testify and that it should be done as soon as possible because keeping him out of the witness box would not be an easy thing to get right.
 SC stands for Senior Counsel i.e. an advocate – akin to the British Queen’s Counsel. Senior Counsels, i.e. advocates, are the only counsel permitted to address the court in a High Court proceeding.
 The Broederbond can best be described as a secret fraternal organisation of pro-capital pro-internationalist liberal assimilated Afrikaners i.e. those who happily accept the appellation Afrikaner and who advance a post-modernist humanist paradigm within South African society. It is distinctly NOT an organisation with which conservative Christian Boers would associate. It possesses a direct and parallel similarity to Freemasonry.
 The only suitable word here is dismay. If what Kapt. Loots says is true then one can easily imagine his dismay at hearing that his persecutors were members of a notorious and sinister organisation. By now he would have known that he didn’t stand a chance against the conspiracy if indeed it was being driven by, or facilitated by, a clandestine hand from within the uppermost reaches of South Africa’s politico-capital establishment.
 I.e. via listening devices
 The Department of Correctional Services is South Africa’s national department in charge of prisons
 Pretoria Central Maximum prison, colloquially known as C-Max
 A suburb of Pretoria, the city in which South Africa’s executive-administrative arm of government is based. Unusually, South Africa has three governmental centers. Cape Town is the seat of parliament. Bloomfontein is the judicial center and Pretoria is the executive center.
 Nyalas are just one model in a long series of domestically-developed, heavily-armoured/secured, South Africa police and military vehicles
 The original Afrikaans makes it clear that he is referring strictly to the recordings which he saw with his own eyes, as it were
 This turn of Afrikaans phrase is difficult to translate without substituting it altogether. Let it suffice to say that it means that they twisted their arms, that they persuaded them for a material consideration.
 Also known as mobile phones elsewhere in the world. In the US we use the colloquial expression cell phones
 Also known as text messages elsewhere in the world
 Here La Cote D’Azure is merely a resort on the south coast of South Africa’s kwaZulu-Natal province and not the famous coastal region of France
 Here Margate is merely the nearby little town of the abovementioned resort and not the British seaside city.
 Margate is an extremely popular getaway destination among Afrikaans-speaking members of South Africa’s inland regions therefore it is not entirely implausible that Capt. Loots and his wife bumped into Nelmarie van Rooyen, possibly on the main beach, during the October school holiday period. On the other hand, this event might have been orchestrated by Miranda Loots. It certainly begs a number of questions.